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CASE NOTES
relating to disputed testimony and issues. 45 As a result of the Urban Coun-
cil decision, institutional decisionmaking in Minnesota parallels the fed-
eral system. 46 Without the onerous burden of reading the entire record
of each hearing, agency administrators may have more time to formulate
policies and supervise subordinates.4 7 Allowing administrators to con-
centrate on policy making and supervisory functions should improve the
operation and efficiency of the administrative system in Minnesota.
Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction--SACHUK v. RUSH: A EULOGY-
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and re-
manded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), arid on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
In Seider v. Roth,I the New York Court of Appeals held that a state may
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction 2 over a nonresident defendant having
45. See id.
46. See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
47. It may be questioned whether agency decisionmakers ever read the entire record
of each hearing prior to Urban Council. Although this requirement seemed to be imposed
on agency heads, it is unlikely that there was full compliance with the law. Practically
speaking, it probably could not have been done. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying
text. It is for this very reason that the conclusion that the Urban Council rule will give
administrators more time is suspect.
1. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The principle estab-
lished in this case is commonly referred to as Seider jurisdiction.
2. The first notable case in the historical development of state court jurisdiction was
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
which defined a state's judicial power by its territorial limits. Pennoyer established that
every state had exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property within that state's bound-
aries. See 95 U.S. at 722. No state, however, could exercise direct jurisdiction over persons
or property outside of its territorial limits. Id. A court's authority over a defendant's
person within its territorial jurisdiction is defined as in personam jurisdiction. Ajudgment
in personam can impose a personal obligation on a defendant. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 199 (1977); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877), overruted, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
An in rem proceeding is one brought directly against property within a court's territory.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 734. Its purpose is to dispose of the property to satisfy a
claim to that property. A judgment in rem is limited to the property involved and cannot
impose personal liability on the property owner. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 199.
In Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), overr ted, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
the Supreme Court expanded jurisdictional concepts by allowing a quasi in rem action
against a nonresident defendant when the property that served as the basis for jurisdiction
was totally unrelated to the cause of action.
The three types ofjurisdiction--in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem-were defined
summarily by the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Court
stated:
A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one per-
son in favor of another. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in
designated property. A judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular
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no forum contacts. 3 Procedurally, this is accomplished by garnishing the
contractual obligation of an insurer doing business in the state to defend
and indemnify the insured in a lawsuit.4 Throughout fourteen years of
controversy, 5 only three states, including Minnesota, have adopted this
persons in designated property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is
seeking to secure a preexisting claim in the subject property and to extinguish or
establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other
the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant
to the satisfaction of a claim against him.
Id. at 246 n.12, quoted in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 n.17 (1977).
In regard to in personam jurisdiction, the strict territorial limitations announced in
Pennoyer were replaced by the minimum contacts theory established in International Shoe
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The theory requires that "if... [the defendant] be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' " Id. at 316 (quoting in part Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). The standard is essentially one of reasonableness. The existence of minimum
contacts depends upon "the quality and nature of the .. .[defendant's] activity." The
assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable when "the defendant purposefully avails... [him-
selfl of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Thus,
the focus ofjurisdictional inquiry in in personam actions shifted from the Pnnayer empha-
sis on the sovereignty of a state over its territory to an examination of the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
204 (1977); notes 54-62 in.ra and accompanying text.
In 1977 the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), extended the
minimum contacts theory to in rem and quasi in rem actions. See id. at 212. When the
defendant in these actions lacks minimum contacts with the forum and when the property
that serves as the basis of jurisdiction is unrelated to the cause of action, the assertion of
jurisdiction is unconstitutional. See id. at 208-09. The Shafer Court stated:
Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a state might suggest
the existence of other ties among the defendant, the state, and the litigation, the
presence of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdiction. If
those other ties did not exist, cases over which the State is now thought to have
jurisdiction could not be brought in that forum.
Id. at 209. In the Court's view, basing jurisdiction solely on the presence of property in the
state was "fundamentally unfair to the defendant." See id. at 212. All assertions ofjuris-
diction whether in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem, are to be evaluated according to the
minimum contacts standard. See id. For further elaboration on the minimum contacts
standard and the Shaffer decision, see notes 54-62 and 87-98 infa and accompanying text.
3. The defendant, a Canadian resident, was sued in New York by two New York
residents for injuries arising out of an accident in Vermont. 17 N.Y.2d at 112, 216 N.E.2d
at 313, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 100. New York acquired jurisdiction by attaching the contractual
obligation of an insurance company, doing business in New York, to defend its insured
against liability in any state in which an accident occurred. Id.
4. See notes 26-30 inkfa and accompanying text.
5. See generally Carrington, The Modern Uility Of Quasi In Ren Jurisdction, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 303 (1962); Reese, The Expanding Scope ofJurisdctaon Over Non-Residents-New York
Gos Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or
Puting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction by
AttaWhment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1075 (1968); Comment, Shaffer v. Heit-
ner's Efect on Pre-judgment Attachment, Jursdiction Based on Property, and New York's Seider
Doctrine Have We Finally Given Up the Ghost of the Res,', 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 323 (1978);
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theory. 6 Furthermore, the constitutionality of Seider jurisdiction has been
Note, The Constitutionaity of Seider v. Roth After Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
409 (1978); Comment, Garnishment Of Intangzbles: Contingent Obligations And The Interstate
Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550 (1967); Note,Jurnsdiction in New York.- A Proposed Re-
form, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (1969); Comment,Jurisiction In Rem and the Attachment of
Intangibles.- Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725; Note, Seider v. Roth: The
Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968); Case Comment, Civil Procedure:
Seider With a Minnesota Flavor-A Federal Court Imports Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on
Garnishment of Liability Insurance Obligations, 1 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161 (1974).
6. New York, New Hampshire, and Minnesota have adopted a Seider theory ofjuris-
diction. For New York cases applying the theory, see O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,
579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); Intermeat, Inc. v. American
Poultry, Inc., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Beja v. Jahangiri, 453 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1972);
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969);
Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, 482 F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Sugarman v. Hyatt, 429
F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Barber-Greene Co. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., 428 F. Supp. 567
(D. Del. 1977); National Bank & Trust Co. of N. America v. J.L.M. Int'l, 421 F. Supp.
1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jones v. Walt Disney World Co., 409 F. Supp. 526 (W.D.N.Y.
1976); Seafood Imports, Inc. v. A.J. Cunningham Packaging Corp., 405 F. Supp. 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Barker v.
Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Wilcox v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 270 F. Supp.
454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
appeal dismissed, 390 U.S. 7 (1968) (court held that it lacked power to enjoin sheriffs from
attaching insurance policies); Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 383 N.E.2d 110, 410
N.Y.S.2d 808 (1978) (per curiam); Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253,
397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977) (upheld Seider but refused to expand to cover case at hand);
Neuman v. Dunham, 39 N.Y.2d 999, 355 N.E.2d 294, 387 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1976) (mem.);
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); Alford v. McGaw, 61
A.D.2d 504, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1978) (upheld Sider with reference to Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977)); Rodriguez v. Wolfe, 93 Misc. 2d 364, 401 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
New Hampshire has adopted Seider theory but limits its application to cases in which
the defendant resides in a state that applies the theory. See Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H.
281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1973).
Under Minnesota law, Seider jurisdiction was first applied in Rintala v. Shoemaker,
362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973), noted in Case Comment, supra note 5. In Rintala, a
federal court, interpreting Minnesota law, found Seider jurisdiction valid. It allowed a
Minnesota resident to acquire jurisdiction over a Michigan resident in a wrongful death
action. The suit arose out of an automobile accident in Florida. Jurisdiction was ob-
tained by garnishing the contractual obligation of the insurer, doing business in Minne-
sota, to defend and indemnify the defendant. The court found that the Minnesota
garnishment statute allowed the attachment of an insurance policy before judgment for
the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction. Although the payment was contin-
gent upon the outcome of the suit, the obligation to pay was absolute. 362 F. Supp. at
1051-52. For other Minnesota cases applying Seider, see Jeans v. Mitchell, 418 F. Supp.
730 (D. Minn. 1976); Adkins v. Northfield Foundry & Machine Co., 393 F. Supp. 1079 (D.
Minn. 1974); Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976), vacated and re-
manded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aj'don remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
320 (1980); notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text; notes 7-42 n7fra.
A number of other New York cases refused to apply a Seider theory of jurisdiction on
various grounds. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 840 (1969) (neither the decedent nor defendants were New York residents, only
1981]
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repeatedly challenged as violative of due process, 7 although its applica-
tion has been upheld on two different rationales, those of quasi in rem
jurisdiction8 and judicially created direct action. 9 In Rush v. Savchuk,10
the administrator); Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Caterpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (lack of minimum contacts between the defendant, litigation, and fo-
rum); Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (unconstitutional because
no right of limited appearance afforded defendant); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 288
N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968) (neither party New York resident); Wallace v. Target Store, Inc., 92
Misc. 2d 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (insufficient contacts between defendant,
litigation, and forum); Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285, 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct.
1977) (in absence of minimum contacts between defendant, litigation, and forum, fortui-
tous presence of insurance policy in New York no longer proper basis for jurisdiction);
Attanasio v. Ferre, 93 Misc. 2d 661, 401 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1977), appeal dimissred, 68
A.D.2d 981, 414 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1979) (lack of minimum contacts between defendant, liti-
gation, and forum; presence of liability in state was "mere fortuity" and insufficient basis
for jurisdiction); Kennedy v. Deroker, 91 Misc. 2d 648, 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977)
(lack of minimum contacts between defendant, litigation, and forum).
California, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Utah and various federal courts have either rejected or disregarded the
doctrine. Set United States Indus. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 908 (1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976); Tessier v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1972); Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d
816 (5th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1970);
Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969)
(limiting Seider jurisdiction to avoid unconstitutionality); Torres v. Towmotor Div. of Cat-
erpillar, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejected Seider in light of Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)); Public Adm'r v. Unimar Shipping Co., 401 F. Supp. 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Seider requires that state have interest to protect residents and therefore
requires state residence not mere citizenship in United States); Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp.
1089 (D. Conn. 1975); Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Robitaille v.
Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974); Ricker v. LaJoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt.
1970); Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (attachment of policy
violated due process); Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 768 (1976), overrahng Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 390
(1973); Bania v. Royal Lahaina Hotel, 37 11. App. 3d 661, 347 N.E.2d 106 (1975) (found
that defendant consented to jurisdiction; unnecessary to apply Seider jurisdiction); Hunt v.
Fireman's Fund Co., 345 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 1977); Belcher v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978); State ex rel. Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v.
Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App. 1970); Pono v. Brock, 408 A.2d 419 (N.H. 1979); Rocca
v. Kenney, 117 N.H. 1057, 381 A.2d 330 (1977); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J. Super. 420, 367
A.2d 1219 (1970); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972);
Jardine v. Donnelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964); De Rentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240,
258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Housley v.
Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 360,
526 P.2d 370 (1974). Seegeneral4, note 5 supra.
7. See generally notes 5-6 supra.
8. See, e.g., Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1053-54 (D. Minn. 1973);
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 485, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1976), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 902 (1977), afdon remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320
(1980); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 636 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 102 (1966). For a general discussion of this rationale, see Case Comment, supra note 5,
at 165-82. See notes 63-65 infra and accompanying text.
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the United States Supreme Court rejected both of these rationales and
laid to rest the ingenious theory of Seider jurisdiction.
Rush v. Savchuk arose out of a single car accident in Elkhart, Indiana, in
which the plaintiff, Jeffrey Savchuk, was injured.I' At the time of the
accident, both Savchuk, a passenger in the car, and the defendant Ran-
dal Rush, the driver of the car, were Indiana residents.12 The car was
insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. under a liabil-
ity policy issued in Indiana. 13 In June of 1973, Savchuk moved to Min-
nesota with his parents and in 1974 commenced a personal injury action
in a Minnesota state court.14 Indiana's guest statute 5 barred a suit by
Savchuk in that state.' 6 Rush had no contacts with Minnesota that
could be used to establish in personam jurisdiction.17 Therefore,
Savchuk sought to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing State
Farm's policy, the terms of which required State Farm to defend and
indemnify Rush. Rush was personally served in Indiana.18
Rush and State Farm appealed the trial court's denial of a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and insufficient process.19
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision in
Savchuk v. Rush20 (Savchuk I). On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case2 for further consid-
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1978), rev'd,
444 U.S. 320 (1980); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (1978).
For an explanation of what constitutes a judicially created direct action, see notes 76-83
itnfra and accompanying text. See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Seider v. Roth After
Shaffer v. Heitner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 413-17 (1978).
10. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
11. Id. at 322. The accident occurred on January 13, 1972.
12. Id.
13. Id. State Farm is an Illinois corporation that does business in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and several Canadian provinces. Id. at 323 n.4.
14. Id. at 322. The complaint alleged negligence and sought $125,000 in damages,
however, the complaint was later amended to $50,000, the face value of the insurance
policy. Id. at 323 & n.5.
15. Act ofJune 7, 1937, ch. 201, § 1, 1937 Ind. Acts 1229 (codified at IND. CODE ANN.
§ 9-3-3-1 (West 1979)).
16. 444 U.S. at 322. The Indiana guest statute protects motor vehicle owners and
operators from liability for injury to or death of a nonpaying passenger resulting from the
operation of the motor vehicle, unless the injury or death results from the wanton or will-
ful misconduct of the owner or operator. See IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (West 1979).
17. See Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 889 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320
(1980).
18. 444 U.S. at 322-23.
19. See id. at 323-24.
20. 311 Minn. 480, 490, 245 N.W.2d 624, 630 (1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S.
902 (1977), aJf'don remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
21. Rush v. Savchuk, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), vacating and remanding, 311 Minn. 480, 245
N.W.2d 624 (1976).
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eration in light of its decision in Shaffer v. Heitner.22 On remand, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court, in Savchuk v. Rush2 3 (Savchuk II), reaffirmed its
earlier ruling by distinguishing the case from Shaffr.24 The United
States Supreme Court reversed.25
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Savchuk I applied a theory of juris-
diction developed in 1966 in Seider v. Roth.26 Two legal fictions underlie
this unique jurisdictional theory. 27 First, the situs of a debt is said to
follow a debtor. Therefore, the debt is subject to garnishment wherever
the debtor is found.2 8 Second, a corporation is present for jurisdictional
22. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shafer, a nonresident plaintiff attempted to bring a share-
holder's derivative suit against 28 current or former officers and directors of a Delaware
corporation. See id. at 189. Using a quasi in rem theory, the plaintiff sought to attach
stock owned by nonresident defendants under a Delaware statute that established Dela-
ware as the situs of ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation even if the certificates
were located in other states. See id. at 190-92. The Court held that the minimum contacts
standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) should be ex-
panded to all assertions of state court jurisdiction. See id. at 212. By extending the mini-
mum contacts standard, the Shaffer Court impliedly overruled Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905), which served as the cornerstone for quasi in rem theory. The Court stated:
It would not be fruitful for us to reexamine the facts of cases decided on the
rationales of Pennoyer [v. Ne] and Harri [v. Balk] to determine whether jurisdic-
tion might have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the
extent that prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977). See note 2 supra. The Court, however,
was silent on the effect Shaffer would have on Seider jurisdiction. The language of the
opinion seemingly permitted a saving construction of the doctrine: "[w]hen claims to the
property itself are the source of the underlying controversy . . . , it would be unusual for
the state where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." 433 U.S. at 207. See
notes 63-65 in)fa and accompanying text. The Court further declined to answer the "ques-
tion [of] whether the presence of defendant's property in a state is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. This
was the issue in Rush. See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text.
23. 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rved, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
24. 272 N.W.2d at 890-93.
25. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 333 (1980), revag, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
26. See note 3 supra.
27. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980). The Court describes the concep-
tual bases of Seider jurisdiction as follows:
The legal fiction that assigns a situs to a debt, for garnishment purposes, wher-
ever the debtor is found is combined with the legal fiction that a corporation is
"present," for jurisdictional purposes, wherever it does business to yield the con-
clusion that the obligation to defend and indemnify is located in the forum for
purposes of the garnishment statute. The fictional presence of the policy obliga-
tion is deemed to give the State the power to determine the policyholder's liabil-
ity for the out-of-state accident.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. This fiction was first announced in the case of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905),
overruled, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In that case, Epstein, a Maryland resi-
dent, had an unsatisfied claim against the defendant Balk, a North Carolina resident. See
198 U.S. at 216. Another North Carolina resident, Harris, had an outstanding debt owed
to Balk. Epstein, upon discovering that Harris was visiting Maryland, garnished the
money owed to Balk. See id. Harris paid the amount of the debt to Epstein's North Caro-
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purposes wherever it does sufficient business to render it amenable to the
judicial authority of that state.2? Together, these two fictions yield the
lina attorney. See id. at 217. In a subsequent suit by Balk against Harris, the trial court
disallowed Harris' contention that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution re-
quired that payment of the debt to Epstein be treated as a discharge of Harris' obligation
to Balk. See id. The basis of the court's refusal to accept Harris' argument was that the
Maryland court had had no jurisdiction to attach the debt owed to Balk because Harris
had been in Maryland only temporarily and the situs of the debt was North Carolina. See
id. The United States Supreme Court held that Maryland did obtain jurisdiction over the
debt and that the full faith and credit clause required North Carolina to honor the Mary-
land judgment. See id. at 226. The Court viewed the debt as an intangible form of prop-
erty belonging to Balk, the situs of which traveled with the debtor. See 1d. at 223. The
debt of an individual debtor could be attached in only one state at a time and the absen-
tee defendant must be given proper notice of the garnishment proceedings and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. See id. at 227. The garnished res could then serve as the basis for
jurisdiction, allowing a court to adjudicate the rights of the plaintiff against the absentee
defendant and order a judgment to the extent of the garnished debt. See id.
In Seider cases, a liability policy is analogized to a debt, and if the debtor-insurer is
present in the forum, the policy is garnishable and may serve as the basis for quasi in rem
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-53 (D. Minn. 1973);
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 483-85, 245 N.W.2d 624, 627-28 (1976), vacated and re-
manded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), afdon remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
320 (1980).
29. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980). Under the territorial concept of
jurisdiction announced in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled, Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), a corporation doing business in a state was either deemed present
within the territory for jurisdictional purposes, see, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234
U.S. 579 (1914), or was deemed to have consented to suit in that state, see Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. at 735-36. See generally Note, Developments in the Lau-State-CourtjunsdictIn,
73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919-23 (1960); note 2 stpra.
The rationales of jurisdictional "presence" and "consent" were superseded by the
minimum contacts test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See
note 2 supra; notes 55-62 infta and accompanying text. Under the minimum contacts test,
the constitutionality of a state court's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
depends upon the existence of "such contacts of the corporation with the State of the
forum as to make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317.
Ordinarily, a corporation "doing business" in a state has "purposefully avail[ed] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws" so that contacts between the corporation and the state are
sufficient to render the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Arguably, the Supreme Court decisions of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1976) and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) invalidate jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation if that jurisdiction is asserted solely on the basis of "doing business"
and the cause of action sued upon is unrelated to the forum state. In both decisions, the
Court held that "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation" was
determinative in assessing the constitutionality of a state court's assertion of jurisdiction.
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1976). This language may be interpreted in several ways.
First, it may indicate that in addition to contacts between the defendant and the
forum, there must exist contacts between the cause of action and the forum. A strict
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conclusion that for purposes of the garnishment statute the obligation to
defend and indemnify exists in every forum in which a corporation is
doing business.
30
Several policy considerations underlie Seider jurisdiction. First, the
theory provides direct remedies for the state's injured residents.3  Sec-
ond, it is an attempt to prevent uncompensated plaintiffs from becoming
dependent on state aid.32 Third, the theory allows the state to regulate
the activities of insurance companies that do business within its bounda-
ries.3 3 Finally, Seider jurisdiction is in accordance with the Minnesota
Supreme Court's intention to extend its jurisdiction "to the maximum
limits consistent with due process."
34
The New York and Minnesota courts adopted different rationales for
construction of this nature would necessitate a radical departure from past practice and
theory. Even if a corporation were incorporated in a state, it could not be sued in that
state if the cause of action arose from outside its boundaries. It is highly unlikely that the
Court intended this result because situations could arise in which no forum exists in which
to litigate.
Second, the Shaffer and Rush holdings could be construed to permit jurisdiction when
either contacts between the defendant and the forum exist or contacts between the cause of
action and the forum exist. Although plausible, this construction runs afoul of language
in the Rush opinion that the defendant must at least have "judicially cognizable ties with a
state, [before] a variety of other factors relating to the particular cause of action may be
relevant to the determination whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at
332-33.
Third, and most likely, the decisions may require that a certain threshold of contacts
exist between the defendant and the forum before other relationships and factors are con-
sidered. The above quoted language appears to support this construction. See id. Exactly
what contacts between the defendant and the forum are sufficient was left unanswered.
Furthermore, as indicated by Shaffer, the nature and quantity of contacts required may
differ as applied to individuals and corporations. "The differences between individuals
and corporations may, of course, lead to the conclusion that a given set of circumstances
establishes state jurisdiction over one type of defendant but not over the other." Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. at 204 n.19. Certainly, incorporation in a state would be sufficient as
would express consent to suit; but whether a corporation licensed to do business or merely
doing business in a state would be sufficient in the absence of other factors, remains un-
clear. For a general discussion of the holdings of Shaffer and Rush, see notes 87-98 h'fra and
accompanying text.
30. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980). In a footnote, the Court indicated
that it was a matter of state law whether an insurance company's obligation fell within a
state's garnishment statute and therefore was not subject to the Court's review. See id. at
328 n.14. The Court went on to say that even assuming the obligation was garnishable
property, that fact alone did not indicate any relationship among the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation. Id.
31. See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (D. Minn. 1973); Savchuk v.
Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Note, supra note 9, at
419.
32. See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (D. Minn. 1973); Note, supra
note 9, at 419.
33. See Note, supra note 9, at 419.
34. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 485, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1976), vacated and
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applying Seider jurisdiction. Garnishment procedures necessary for the
application of Seider are statutory. New York interpreted its garnishment
statute3 5 to allow the prejudgment garnishment of an insurance policy
on the ground that a claim asserted against an insurance policy is due
and owing absolutely at the time that the liability-causing event oc-
curs. 36 By adopting this construction, the court indulged in circular rea-
soning. An indebtedness is not garnishable unless it is absolutely payable
either at present or in the future and is not dependent upon any contin-
gency.3 7 In cases involving an insurance policy, the contingency is a
judgment against the insured. Furthermore, the court cannot obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction until the property that serves as the basis of
jurisdiction is brought before the court through garnishment. 38 Thus,
the debt cannot exist until litigated, and it cannot be litigated until it is
found to exist within the forum.39 By disregarding the contingent nature
of an insurance policy, the New York court bootstrapped itself into as-
sertingjurisdiction.40 In contrast, the Minnesota statute41 expressly per-
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aft'd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444
U.S. 320 (1980).
35. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw §5201 (McKinney 1978) states:
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or is yet
to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it
was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident,
unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt
may consist of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred within or
without the State.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 6202 (McKinney 1980) states that any debt against which a
money judgment may be enforced under section 5201 is subject to attachment.
36. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113,216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101
(1966).
The Seider court relied heavily on an earlier court of appeals decision in In re Estate of
Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962). The decision in Estate of
Rtggle established that a creditor-debtor relationship existed between a nonresident in-
sured and a liability insurer even though no judgment was rendered against the insured or
his estate. Seid. at 76, 181 N.E.2d at 438, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 417. The Seider court extended
this holding to encompass the garnishment of an insurance policy for the purpose of estab-
lishing quasi in rem jurisdiction. The Seider dissent, however, distinguished Estate of Riggle
on the ground that it dealt only with the appointment of an administrator. See Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315-16, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04 (Burke, J., dissent-
ing). Because no rights have been determined in a proceeding to appoint an administrator
a recognition of a creditor-debtor relationship in that context would not prejudice the
parties. See id. at 116-17, 216 N.E.2d at 316, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 104 (Burke, J., dissenting).
37. See note 2, 28 supra.
38. See Note, supra note 9, at 412; note 2, 28 supra.
39. See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-49 (D. Minn. 1973); Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 506, 402 N.Y.S.2d
499, 501 (1978).
41. See MINN. STAT. § 571.41(2) (1980), which reads in part:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in any
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mits the prejudgment garnishment of an insurance policy even though
the obligation is not due absolutely and is contingent.42 Therefore, Min-
nesota did not have to engage in circular reasoning to justify Seider juris-
diction.
A major concern of the Savchuk I court was the compliance of Seider
jurisdiction with the constitutional requirement of due process. 43 Before
the United States Supreme Court's reversal of Savchuk II, the standard
for determining the constitutionality of a prejudgment garnishment pro-
cedure consisted of three parts: (1) defendant insured must be given
action in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a garnishee sum-
mons before judgment therein in the following instances only:
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction
and that
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation, part-
nership or association.
(3) The garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship,
guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to respond
to any person for the claim asserted against the debtor in the main action.
Id.
The predecessor to the above statute was amended in 1969 to permit prejudgment
garnishment. See Act ofJune 9, 1969, ch. 1142, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 2479, 2481 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 571.41(2) (1980)). In analyzing the effect of this amendment, a federal
court stated:
[A] judgment is no longer necessary when seizing an insurance policy under
which the insurer may be liable for a claim asserted against its insured ....
The legislature's intent in modifying Minn. Stat. § 571.41, by adding Subd. 2
after Seider can be inferred to allow this type of procedure in Minnesota.
Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1050-51 (D. Minn. 1973) (emphasis in original).
One potential problem in Seider is the difficulty in assessing the value of the insurer's
obligation to defend the insured under the liability policy. "Even if the obligation to
defend were regarded as noncontingent, its inclusion would not make attachment feasible.
It is at least arguable that the duty to defend would be exhausted in the course of the
attachment proceeding." Id. (quoting Comment, Garnirhment Of Intangibles. Contingent Obi-
gations And The Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 552 (1967)). Minnesota, by
expressly allowing the prejudgment garnishment of an insurance policy, avoided this
troublesome issue entirely. See 362 F. Supp. at 1051.
42. See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 484, 245 N.W.2d 624, 627 (1976), vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), a'd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), revzd, 444
U.S. 320 (1980). See generally Case Comment, supra note 5, at 172-79.
The courts have interpreted this statute as it applies to the garnishment of insurance
policies in two cases. In Adkins v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1079
(D. Minn. 1974), the court declared that the garnishment statute was limited to cases in
which either the plaintiff is a resident of the forum or the accident occurred in the forum
state. The court stressed the importance of avoiding blatant forum shopping, the necessity
of the forum state in having a recognizable and protectable interest in the case, and the
avoidance of any unfair burden that might be placed upon either the nonresident defend-
ant or its insurance company. See id. at 1081. In Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044
(D. Minn. 1973), the court interpreted the statute to provide for the prejudgment garnish-
ment of an insurance policy. There need be only the possibility of a valid judgment
against either the insured personally or against his property. See id. at 1051-52.
43. See 311 Minn. at 483, 245 N.W.2d at 627.
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proper notice, affording him adequate opportunity to defend his prop-
erty;44 (2) defendant cannot be subjected to liability beyond the amount
of his insurance policy;45 and (3) the procedure may only be employed
by residents of the forum state.
4 6
Most insurance policies require the cooperation of an insured with the
insurer in the defense of a claim.47 If a defendant in a Setder case fails to
appear in the court ofjuridiction, his right to indemnification is jeopard-
ized.48 If-a defendant makes an appearance, and if it is treated as a
"general appearance," which subjects a defendant to the personal juris-
diction of the court, a defendant risks exposure to liability greater than
the amount of the insurance policy.49 What started as quasi in rem juris-
diction could result in personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 50 To avoid
44. See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (D. Minn. 1973). In the first
Savchuk decision, the defendant was given proper notice and an adequate opportunity to
defend his property when he was served personally in Indiana with the summons and
complaint and a copy of the garnishment summons. See 311 Minn. at 482, 245 N.W.2d at
626.
45. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054-55 (D. Minn. 1973);
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 485, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1976), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 902 (1977), afd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320
(1980); notes 50-52 infta and accompanying text.
46. New York limits the application of Seide jurisdiction to cases in which the plain-
tiff is a resident of New York at the time that the cause of action arose. See O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 n.6 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978);
Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840
(1969). In Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968), the court held that
Seider jurisdiction was not applicable. The plaintiff, a Norwegian citizen, was injured in
an automobile accident that occurred in North Carolina. The defendants were North
Carolinians insured by an Ohio insurance company that issued a policy to the defendants
in North Carolina. The only New York contact was the insurance company's authoriza-
tion to do business in New York. Id. at 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, on the other hand, has extended Seidae jurisdiction to
its extreme by applying it to a plaintiff who was not a Minnesota resident at the time his
injuries occurred. See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 482, 245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976),
oacated and reanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aftdon remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978),
revi'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Shaffer, the distinction between New York and Minnesota law is no longer relevant. The
Court focuses its constitutional analysis on the relationship of the forum to the defendant
and to the litigation. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977); note 29 supra and
accompanying text; notes 54-62, 87-98 infra and accompanying text.
47. See Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054 (D. Minn. 1973).
48. See id.
49. A defendant's general appearance traditionally has been recognized as a basis for
asserting in personam jurisdiction because the defendant is then found within the bounda-
ries of the state. Therefore, he is within the territorial power of the jurisdiction. Seegener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1971).
50. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054-55 (D. Minn. 1973);
Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 486, 245 N.W.2d 624, 628 (1976), vacated and remanded,
433 U.S. 902 (1977), a'd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320
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this violation of due process, both New York and Minnesota recognize
"limited appearances" in Seider cases5 ' and restrict recovery against the
defendant to an amount not greater than the face value of the insurance
policy. 52 Similarly, Seider judgments have not been given res judicata
treatment in other jurisdictions nor have prior adjudications of liability
been given collateral estoppel effect because to do so transforms a quasi
in rem judgment to one in personam.
5 3
In Shaffer v. Heitner,54 the United States Supreme Court adopted a new
standard for the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Shaffer applied the
minimum contacts theory of International Shoe Co. v. Washington 55 to quasi
in rem jurisdiction, and concluded that without minimum contacts, state
courts cannot assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.56 In es-
sence, the minimum contacts theory is the yardstick against which due
process "reasonableness" is measured for assertions of jurisdiction.57 Un-
der International Shoe, the contacts must be such that "maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' "58 The adequacy of the contacts depends on the nature, quality,
(1980). Absent a provision allowing "limited appearances," a defendant in a quasi in rem
proceeding faces the choice of either not appearing, in which case a default judgment is
entered with a consequent forfeiture of the garnished property, or appearing and risking a
judgment in excess of the liability policy. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 414-15.
51. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1968),cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1054-55 (D. Minn. 1973).
52. See, e.g., Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 487, 245 N.W.2d 624, 629 (1976), va-
cated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), aj'don remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd,
444 U.S. 320 (1980); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 991, 238 N.E.2d 319, 320, 290
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (1968) (per curiam) (dictum), denying rehearing to 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234
N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
53. Because the theory underlying Seider is to allow a direct action against the insurer
who conducts the defense, to preclude the insured from raising issues in subsequent litiga-
tion would be a denial of due process. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579
F.2d 194, 201-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410
F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE &
H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAW 738-39 (2d ed. 1975); Carrington, Collateral Estoppel and For-
ezgnJudgments, 24 OHIO ST. LJ. 381, 384 (1963); Note, Developments in the Law. Resjudi-
cata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 835 (1952). In addition, a collateral estoppel effect relating to
damages would be tantamount to disallowing limited appearances and would be constitu-
tionally unsound for the same reason. See Case Comment, supra note 5, at 181.
54. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For discussion of this case see note 22 supra.
55. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56. The Court stated that "[w]e therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny." 433 U.S. at 212.
57. The International Shoe Court elaborated on this "reasonableness" standard by re-
quiring that there be "such contacts ... with the state of the forum as make it reasonable,
in the context of our federal system of government, to require the .. . [defendant] to
defend the particular suit which is brought there." 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (relationship between de-
fendant and forum must be such that it is reasonable to require defense there).
58. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See Hanson v.
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and circumstances of the contacts. 59 Sufficient contacts may be estab-
lished by continuous and systematic activities by a defendant in the fo-
rum, or by the presence of a defendant's property in the forum that is the
subject matter of the litigation.60 The Shafr Court stated that the classi-
fication of an action as in rem or in personam should not determine if
due process has been met because " 'the phrase, judicial jurisdiction over
a thing, is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing.' ",61 The application of the minimum con-
tacts theory results in a shift in emphasis from a plaintiff's relationship to
the forum to an almost exclusive focus on a defendant's relationship to
the forum and the forum's relationship to the litigation.
62
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (requiring that defendant engage in purposeful activity
in forum state thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, which renders
exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable).
59. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); Note,
Due Process and Long Arm Jurisdiction in Minnesota. A Criticism of the Minimum Contacts Stan-
dard, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 297 (1979).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), decided with Rush,
identified factors that should be weighed in applying the International Shoe standard: (1)
the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief (at least when that interest is
not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum); (4) the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5)
the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental, substantive social poli-
cies. Id. at 292.
In World-Wde Volkrwagen, plaintiffs brought a products liability action in an
Oklahoma court against the manufacturer of Audi automobiles, its importer, its regional
distributor, and its retail dealer for an accident arising in Oklahoma. Neither the regional
distributor nor retail dealer, both New York corporations, did business in Oklahoma. Id.
at 288-89. The Court held that the foreseeability that a purchaser of an automobile in
New York would suffer an accident in Oklahoma was not a sufficient basis for the asser-
tion of in personam jurisdiction. See id. at 295-96. The Court specifically rejected plain-
tiffs' argument that the purposeful actions of defendants in choosing to become part of a
nationwide network for marketing and servicing automobiles established the necessary
minimum contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction. See id. at 298-99. For a further
discussion of the holding in this case, see notes 93-98 infa and accompanying text.
60. The Shaffer Court stated:
[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy
between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant's
claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected
to benefit from the State's protection of his interest.
433 U.S. at 207-08. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
61. 433 U.S. at 207 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Intro-
ductory Note § 56 (1971)).
62. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
204 (1977). But see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)
(stating that plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief is relevant fac-
tor in assessing constitutionality of state court jurisdiction). See generally notes 87-98 infra
and accompanying text.
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On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to distinguish
Savchuk fI from Shaffer. The court recognized that the defendant had no
contacts with Minnesota that would allow imposition of personal juris-
diction over him, 63 but argued that the insurance company, which was
the real party in interest, satisfied the minimum contacts requirement.
64
The court further argued that the insurance policy was the subject mat-
ter of the litigation. The court viewed the policy as the true focus of
judicial scrutiny, since it determined the rights and obligations of both
the insured and the insurer.
6 5
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of
the Savchuk II court. 66 The Supreme Court held that "it cannot be said
that the defendant engaged in any purposeful activity related to the forum
that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just or reasonable . . .
merely because his insurer does business there," 67 and stated further that
the insurance policy was not the subject matter of the litigation. In the
Court's view, judicial inquiry is focused upon the defendant's conduct
rather than the contractual relationship between the insured and in-
surer.68 Furthermore, no contacts as defined by International Shoe existed
between defendant Rush and the forum state.69 The Court in Rush held
that the Minnesota court's aggregation of the forum contacts of State
Farm and Rush to find jurisdiction under the minimum contacts stan-
dard is unconstitutional. 70 The requirements of International Shoe must be
satisfied for each defendant before a state court may exercise jurisdic-
tion.71
Although in Rush no other forum was available to the plaintiff, the
Court focused exclusively on the absence of the forum's contacts with the
defendant. 72 If a plaintiffs contacts with a forum determine jurisdiction,
courts would be unable to control forum shopping. 73 Extending Seider
63. See 272 N.W.2d at 892.
64. See id. at 893. See gmerally International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
317 (1945); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1057 (D. Minn. 1973).
65. 272 N.W.2d at 892. The court distinguished Shaffr on the basis that the Dela-
ware sequestration procedure could be used in any suit brought against a nonresident and
was not tailored to meet Delaware's asserted "interest of managing state-chartered corpo-
rations." Id. at 891. On the other hand, the court found that the attachment procedure in
Minnesota is specifically aimed at furthering the legitimate state interest of facilitating
recoveries for injured residents. Id. at 891-92. Finally, the court noted that the seques-
tered stock in Shafer was not related to the cause of action, but was merely a means of
obtaining the defendant's personal appearance. Id. at 892.
66. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
67. Id. at 329 (emphasis in original).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 329-30; notes 55-62 supra and accompanying text.
70. See 444 U.S. at 331-32.
71. See id. at 332.
72. See id. at 332-33; notes 87-98 infra and accompanying text.
73. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 495, 245 N.W.2d 624, 633 (1976) (Otis, J., dis-
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jurisdiction to cases in which the plaintiff was not a resident at the time
the cause of action arose subjects Minnesota to this criticism.74 As one
dissenting justice in Savchuk I stated: "Allowing a potential plaintiff to
move to this state after his cause of action has arisen and to invoke Seider
to bring the case to Minnesota means that a plaintiff has a choice of 50
jurisdictions in which to sue."
'75
The garnishment procedure as applied in Seider cases appears to au-
thorize a direct action against an insurer.76 A direct action statute allows
an injured party to sue the tortfeasor's insurer without joining the in-
sured. 77 Underlying a direct action statute is the recognition that liabil-
ity insurance "is not issued primarily for the protection of the insured,
but for the protection of the public."
78
Se'der jurisdiction has been criticized as judicial legislation.79 At pres-
ent, no legislation permitting direct actions against insurers has been en-
acted in either New York or Minnesota, 80 nor has there been any
senting), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), a don remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). Set Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044, 1056 (D.
Minn. 1973) (forum shopping a possibility, unless plaintiff is a resident of forum).
74. See note 46 supra.
75. See 311 Minn. at 495, 245 N.W.2d at 633 (Otis, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
320 (1980); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (1978).
77. See Watson v. Employees Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). The
Watron Court upheld the constitutionality of Louisiana's direct action statute, but the
statute was applicable only if the cause of action arose in the state or the insured was
domiciled there. See id. at 68 n.4. Thus, the statute would not have conferred jurisdiction
in a case similar to Rush because the accident occurred outside the state and the insured
was not a resident.
78. See Myers v. Government Employers Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 365-66, 225 N.W.2d
238, 242 (1974) (quoting West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 209, 46 So. 2d 122, 130
(1950)). The Minnesota Supreme Court has permitted direct actions in cases in which the
law of the controlling jurisdiction permitted them, but has prohibited direct actions in
suits by Minnesota residents against Minnesota defendants. See id. at 366, 225 N.W.2d at
243.
79. See, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (E.D.N.Y.
1977), aj'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
80. Direct action bills have been proposed in both the Minnesota House and Senate.
See S.F. 2262, 71st Minn. Legis., 1980 Sess.; H.F. 2212, 71st Minn. Legis., 1980 Sess.
Under the proposed legislation, an insurer that conducts business in this state would be
directly liable to an injured party entitled to recover under a policy issued by the insur-
ance company. A direct action would be permitted even if the liability of the insurer is
contingent upon a final judgment against the insured.
Should these bills be enacted into law, the application of the law might be constitu-
tionally challenged. Of particular concern is whether the mere fact that an insurance
company is licensed to do business in a state satisfies the minimum contacts standard as
required by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and renders the
exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or reasonable. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328-29
(1980). The Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), stated: "Although the pres-
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attempt in either state to modify legislatively the direct action implica-
tions of Seider.8 1 From a direct action perspective, the real party in inter-
est is the insurance company. 82 The insured is but a nominal defendant
who is obligated to cooperate with the insurer. Judgment for a plaintiff
will not deprive a defendant of anything substantial. The defendant
cannot use the insurance policy for anything other than to protect him-
self from liability.
83
The United States Supreme Court in reversing Savchuk II rejected the
idea that Seider actions are equivalent to direct actions. Before a state
court may exercise jurisdiction over the insurer it must be able to exert its
power over a nominal defendant.84 The Court also implied that a de-
fendant in a Seider action may have more than a nominal interest in the
litigation. For instance, a defendant's integrity, competence or profes-
sional standing may be jeopardized.8 5 Furthermore, a defendant who is
sued by multiple plaintiffs in several states could be liable for an amount
in excess of the policy limits.86 For these reasons, the impact of the litiga-
tion on a nonresident defendant cannot be ignored.
In light of the United States Supreme Court's reversal of Savchuk II,
Seider jurisdiction is no longer valid. In Seider jurisdiction, the emphasis
was placed upon the relationship of a plaintiff, rather than that of a de-
fendant, to the forum.8 7 The contractual obligation of an insurer to de-
ence of the defendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among
the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not
support the State's jurisdiction." Id. at 209.
Another constitutional issue that would arise in relation to a direct action statute is
the extent to which a state may apply its own law without violating due process. Minne-
sota courts have consistently applied the law most favorable to plaintiffs in long-arm cases.
See Myers v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Minn. 359, 225 N.W.2d 238 (1974);
Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
The Minnesota court's approach in these cases may have extended jurisdiction beyond
constitutional limits by ignoring the forum's relationship to the cause of action and the
defendant. But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981), di~swrsed in note 105
infa.
81. Supporters of the direct action approach rely on the absence of corrective meas-
ures taken by the legislature as evidence of legislative support of the Seider procedure. See
Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 142, 366 N.E.2d 253, 256, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595
(1977); Alford v. McGaw, 61 A.D.2d 504, 509, 402 N.Y.S.2d 499, 503 (1978).
82. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313, 318 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
83. See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1978); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 118 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969); Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 892 n.6 (Minn. 1978), reud, 444
U.S. 320 (1980).
84. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 331.
85. See id. at n.20.
86. See i'd.
87. See notes 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
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fend and indemnify the insured was used to establish quasi in rem
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court now has firmly established the mini-
mum contacts standard articulated in International Shoe as the sole basis
for jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.88 The focus in such cases is
on the relationship of a defendant to the forum and the relationship of
the forum to the litigation.8 9 The contractual obligation between a de-
fendant and his insurer does not satisfy the minimum contacts require-
ment and thus jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine cannot be invoked.9°
In most instances, the abandonment of Seider jurisdiction will not leave
a plaintiff without a remedy in the state in which the accident occurred
or in which the defendant resides. Rush was an exception because the
plaintiff in Indiana was barred by that state's guest statute.9 ' In Rush,
the Supreme Court did not discuss specifically the situation in which no
other forum is available. The Rush Court reiterated the conclusion in
Shaffir that the central focus of the minimum contacts analysis rests not
on the plaintiff but on the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.92 In
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,93 however, a case decided the
same day as Rush, the Court identified factors other than the relationship
among the defendant, forum, and litigation that should be weighed in
applying the International Shoe standard. Five factors were listed by the
Court: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum's interest in adju-
dicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief (at least when that interest is not adequately pro-
tected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum); (4) the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental, substantive social policies.94 Of particular interest is the
third factor which considers the plaintiff's interest in litigating in the fo-
rum. If no other forum is available to a plaintiff, a plaintiff's contacts
with the forum may be a factor in deciding whether jurisdiction is appro-
priate.
88. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. at 327-28; notes 55-62 supra and accompanying
text; notes 89-97 infta and accompanying text.
89. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 63-71 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 15-16 supra.
92. The Rush Court stated:
The justifications offered in support of Sider jurisdiction share a common
characteristic: they shift the focus of the inquiry from the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to that among the plaintiff, the fo-
rum, the insurer and the litigation .... In other words, the plaintiff's contacts
with the forum are decisive in determining whether the defendant's due process
rights are violated.
Such an approach is forbidden by Intenational Shoe and its progeny.
444 U.S. at 332.
93. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
94. Id. at 292. See note 59 supra.
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This apparent contradiction between the two decisions may be ex-
plained by the last paragraph of the Rush opinion.95 The Court stated
that when "judicially cognizable ties" exist between a defendant and the
forum, other unspecified factors related to the subject matter of the liti-
gation would be relevant to the International Shoe reasonableness stan-
dard.96 In Rush, however, the Court stressed that the defendant had no
ties with the state. 97 Thus, the Court implied that when some contacts
exist, other interests, presumably the World- Wide Volkswagen factors,
should be considered.98
The Rush decision abrogated a doctrine that has been the focus of vig-
orous legal debate since its inception.99 Seider jurisdiction has been criti-
cized primarily for promoting forum shopping and exposing defendants
to unknown risks of litigation by the mere fortuity of where their insur-
ance companies happen to do business.10 It has been criticized further
for the inconvenience it imposes on a defendant. When the imposition of
jurisdiction is unduly burdensome on a defendant, courts may allow a
transfer of the case based onfonum non conveniens.1tO This remedy, how-
95. See 444 U.S. at 332-33.
96. See id. at 332. The Court, however, did not cite World- Wide Volkswagen after this
language, even though doing so would have clarified the Court's reasoning.
97. Id. at 332-33. ("Here, however, the defendant has no contacts with the forum
.... " (emphasis in original)).
98. For an excellent discussion of the "reordering" of jurisdictional principles after
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), see Woods, Pennoyer's Demire: PersonalJuridiction
After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 20 ARiz. L. REv. 861 (1978).
Professor Woods proposes a three-step analytical model to assess the due process basis
for any assertion ofjurisdiction. First, the inquiry must focus on whether the forum has a
legitimate governmental interest in the subject matter of the litigation. This initial in-
quiry, which Professor Woods views as being identical to the minimum contacts analysis,
is designed to identify the minimum rational nexus between the parties, the forum, and
the litigation. If a sufficient nexus is absent, any additional inquiry is precluded. If a
sufficient nexus exists, a court is said to have "preliminary jurisdiction." Second, it must
be ascertained whether the contact(s) between the defendant and the forum results from
"purposeful activity" as defined by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). If "pur-
poseful activity" exists, the defendant is deemed to have "fair notice" that the forum may
exercise jurisdiction over him. In the absence of "purposeful activity" a court is prohib-
ited from asserting jurisdiction. Finally, it must be determined whether the assertion of
jurisdiction over the defendant offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" as developed by a long line of case law. See Woods, supra at 881-98.
99. See note 5 supra.
100. See Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888, 895-96 (Minn. 1978) (Otis, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
101. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 489-90, 245 N.W.2d 624, 630 (1976), oaatedand
remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), ajfd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444
U.S. 320 (1980). See Hill v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 252 Minn. 165, 167, 89
N.W.2d 654, 657 (1958) (must be at least two forums open to plaintiff before doctrine of
forum non conveniens is applicable).
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ever, is not always available to a defendant102 and reliance on the free-
dom of transfer presupposes jurisdiction. 103
In essence, Seider cases are in personam actions "parading in in rem
disguise."1 4 With the additional complications posed by multiple party
litigation and conflicts of law,105 Seider theory presents jurisdictional
102. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1034 (1969); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 A.D.2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1968).
103. See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 496, 245 N.W.2d 624, 633 (1976) (Otis, J.,
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), afd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888
(Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
104. Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-ftoblemsfor Both Sides, 159 N.Y.L.J. § 16, at 1,
col. 3 (1968).
105. In Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), revd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), the
court stated that "Minnesota's legitimate interest in facilitating recoveries for resident
plaintiffs not only requires provision of a local forum, but may override traditional choice
of law analysis." 272 N.W.2d at 891-92. Therefore, the Minnesota court presumably
would have applied Minnesota's comparative negligence statute rather than Indiana's
contributory negligence rule and would have declined to apply Indiana's guest statute.
See Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 496, 245 N.W.2d 624, 633 (1976) (Otis, J., dissent-
ing), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977), afd on remand, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn.
1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Several cases illustrate the extent to which the Minnesota Supreme Court has stretch-
ed choice of law analysis. In Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978),
affd, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981), the court applied Minnesota law that permitted the "stacking"
of uninsured motorist coverages in a suit against a nonresident corporation doing business
in Minnesota. The injury occurred in Wisconsin and involved Wisconsin residents, one of
whom worked in Minnesota although the injury was unrelated to h's employment. Plain-
tiff, decedent's widow, subsequently moved to Minnesota, had her husband's will pro-
bated in the state, and brought suit in Minnesota to recover insurance benefits. The only
apparent contacts between the parties, forum, and litigation were that plaintiff was a Min-
nesota resident at the time of suit, that the decedent worked in Minnesota, and that de-
fendant was doing business in Minnesota. See 289 N.W.2d at 47.
In Follese v. Eastern Airlines, 271 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1978), ,the court applied Min-
nesota workers' compensation law in an action against a foreign corporation that did busi-
ness in the state. The suit arose out of a personal injury that occurred outside of
Minnesota. The plaintiff, although technically a Minnesota resident, had been living in
Florida for eight years and had signed her employment contract there. See id. at 832-33.
In Schwartz v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665
(1974), the court applied the Minnesota comparative negligence statute, rather than the
Indiana rule of contributory negligence, to an action against a foreign corporation that
was licensed to do business in the state. As in the preceding cases, the injury and the
defendant's business were unrelated to the forum. See id. at 489, 221 N.W.2d at 666-67.
"Judicial jurisdiction," which refers to the power of a court to affect legal interests
before it, must be distinguished from "legislative jurisdiction," which refers to the power
of a state to apply forum law. Seegenerally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw §§ 29-
55 (3d ed. 1977). It is clear that a state deprives a party of due process by applying the law
of a forum having no interest in the matter. See id. § 55, at 105-06. Minimum contacts
analysis governs the constitutionality of choice of law as well as assertions of jurisdiction.
The issue, however, of what contacts are sufficient to satisfy "fair play and substantial
justice" in regard to legislative and judicial jurisdiction is different. "The question of what
law may govern and what court may act are similar though not the same. The lines that
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problems so unusual that they are difficult even to articulate.'o6 The
Rush decision conclusively settled this controversy. By declaring Seider
jurisdiction unconstitutional, the Court provided clarity and consistency
to an ambiguous and confusing area. One developing standard, guided
by minimum contacts analysis, now governs any constitutional assess-
ment of jurisdiction. Unless revived by the legislature through a direct
action statute, 10 7 Seider jurisdiction has become a relic of the past.
delineate the answers to the questions seem to be converging but they have not merged."
Id. at 106.
Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct.
633 (1981), the leading case on the constitutional limits of choice of law was Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936). Dick involved a fire insurance contract entered into in Mexico, by Mexican
parties, on a boat operating in Mexican waters with insurance proceeds payable in Mex-
ico. The contract stipulated that liability was limited to actions filed within one year after
date of loss. This provision was valid under Mexican law but invalid under Texas law.
The policy was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff who was a Texas resident although
living in Mexico. The boat burned in Mexican waters. The Supreme Court held that
Texas could not apply its law to invalidate the limitation clause without violating due
process. See id. at 410. The Texas residence of the plaintiff was not sufficient to support
application of Texas law, particularly when that residence was "technical" because he
actually lived in Mexico. See id. at 408.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981), the Supreme Court further de-
fined the constitutional limits on choice of law. Affirming Minnesota's application of fo-
rum law, the Court stated that Minnesota had three contacts with the parties and cause of
action which, in aggregate, proved sufficient under the full faith and credit and due pro-
cess clauses. See id. at 640. The Court found Minnesota's most significant connection with
the decedent was that Minnesota was decedent's place of employment. In the Court's
view, the fact that the decedent "was not killed while commuting to work or while in
Minnesota does not dictate a different result." Id. at 641. In addition, the Court noted
defendant's presence and business activity within Minnesota and the respondent's current
Minnesota residence. See id. at 642-43. In regard to this last factor, the Court stated "that
a postoccurrence change of residence to the forum state was insufficient in and of itself to
confer power on the forum state to choose its law. ... Id. at 643 (citing John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)). The Court also held that "[w]e express
no view whether the first two contacts, either together or separately, would have sufficed
to sustain the choice of Minnesota law .... " Id. at 644 n.29.
Although in Rush, the Court did not directly address the conflicts of law issue, the
facts seem remarkably similar to the Dick and Yates cases. See 444 U.S. at 325 n.8. The
injury arose outside Minnesota between then Indiana residents. The action was brought
by a plaintiff whose Minnesota residence may be characterized as "technical" because he
moved to Minnesota after the cause of action arose. Although defendant's insurer did
business in Minnesota, the most significant factor stressed by the Hague Court, that of
decedent's employment in Minnesota, was not present within the facts of Rush. The Rush
Court, by failing to find judicial jurisdiction, refused to reach this troublesome issue. It
appears likely, however, that if the issue had been ripe for consideration, the Court would
have found Minnesota's contacts with the parties and the cause of action insufficient to
sustain the application of forum law.
106. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 317, 234 N.E.2d 669, 675-76, 287
N.Y.S.2d 633, 642-43 (1967) (Burke, J., dissenting), aj'don reheanng, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238
N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam).
107. See note 80 supra.
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